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Environmental risks, localization and the overseas subsidiary performance of 
MNEs from an emerging economy 
 
Abstract  
Despite the fact that multinational enterprises (MNEs) from emerging economies invest 
actively in host countries with substantial risks, we have limited understanding of how they 
manage environmental risks to achieve desirable performance in their overseas subsidiaries. 
Drawing on resource dependence theory, we argue that different localization strategies serve 
as a mediating mechanism linking environmental risks and overseas subsidiary performance. 
Our findings based on a sample of Chinese MNEs show that industry risks significantly 
reduce the levels of input localization and marketing localization of Chinese MNEs’ 
subsidiaries, and thus negatively affect subsidiary performance. Political risks have an 
insignificant impact on input localization and marketing localization, but a positive direct 
impact on Chinese MNEs’ overseas subsidiary performance. We also find that state-owned 
MNEs’ localization strategies are more sensitive to industry risks compared with privately 
owned MNEs.  
 
Keywords: Chinese MNEs, environmental risks, localization strategies, subsidiary 
performance. 
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1. Introduction 
Outward foreign direct investment (FDI) is being increasingly adopted as a key expansion 
strategy for firms from emerging economies (EEs) (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss & 
Zheng, 2007; Cui & Jiang, 2012; Lu, Zhou, Bruton & Li, 2010; Rui & Yip, 2008; Wang, 
Hong, Kafouros & Wright, 2012). This strategy, however, is associated with several difficult 
challenges because of the heightened international exposure, competition and additional 
environmental risks present in foreign host countries (Elango, 2009; Lu, Liu, Wright & 
Filatotchev, 2014; Jimenes & Delgado-Garcia, 2012). Environmental risks in host countries, 
such as political and industry risk, represent uncertainties and potential threats for 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Cuypers & Martin, 2010; Henisz, 2000, 2002). While 
much research in this area has found that environmental risks negatively affect firm 
performance (Chan, Isobe & Makino, 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006, 2008; Deephouse & 
Wiseman, 2000; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Lambsdorff, 2003; Makino, Isobe & Chan, 2004; 
Wei, 2000a; 2000b; Veliyath & Ferris, 1997), several studies have also shown that 
environmental risks, especially political risks, can also present opportunities for MNEs with 
the political capability to proactively manage such risks for competitive advantage (García-
Canal & Guillén, 2008; Jimenes & Delgado-Garcia, 2012). However, previous research has 
focused on the direct impact of environmental risks on subsidiary actions and performance 
through the lenses of institutional theory or transaction cost theory (e.g. Ahlstrom, Bruton & 
Yeh, 2008; Chan et al., 2008; Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas & Svobodina, 2004). How 
MNEs respond to the external environment risks has been relatively under-explored (Makino, 
Lau & Yeh, 2002). More specifically, we know relatively little about the mechanisms through 
which environmental risks impact subsidiary performance of MNEs. 
In addition, extant research has tended to focus on how MNEs from more developed 
economies, such as the United States (U.S.), Europe and Japan cope with environmental risk 
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when operating in host countries (Elango, 2009; Mitchell et al., 1992). However, fewer 
studies have examined how emerging economy MNEs (EMNEs) deal with such risks when 
venturing abroad. There is a need to delineate the path from environmental risks to the 
subsidiary performance of EMNEs, given that EMNEs originating from underdeveloped 
institutional environments may respond to environmental risks differently compared with 
established MNEs from developed countries (Luo & Tung, 2007; Makino et al., 2002).     
To address these research gaps, we adopt the resource dependence perspective (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978) to address the following research question: How and to what extent do 
localization strategies adopted by EMNEs in host countries mediate the impact of 
environmental risk on subsidiary performance? We propose that localization can act as an 
intermediate factor between environmental risks and subsidiary performance. Specifically, 
we focus on two aspects of localization, input localization and marketing localization, and 
their relationships with two environmental risks, namely political and industry risks, and 
subsidiary performance.  
This study thus contributes to theory by extending the existing MNE literature on risk 
and subsidiary performance in general, and EMNEs in particular, in a number of ways. First, 
our research extends resource dependence theory (RDT) to understand the extent to which 
localization strategies mediate the impact of environmental risks on subsidiary performance. 
The findings from our study provide new insight into mediating mechanisms and thus 
contribute to theory in opening the black box of these mechanisms (Dunbar & Ahlstrom, 
1995). In particular, environmental risks’ effect on resource exchanges between subsidiaries 
and local environments in a host country is examined through input and marketing 
localization strategies. By making a trade-off between autonomy and environmental 
dependence when facing environmental risks in host countries, EMNEs tend to use intra-
organizational resources to reduce environmental dependence (Feinberg & Gupta, 2009). 
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This aspect adds to our understanding of how EMNEs in the early stage of 
internationalization manage environmental dependence when facing environmental risks.  
Second, we further extend the concept of localization beyond staff localization by 
considering a wide range of input and marketing localization. This helps broaden our 
understanding of localization and its implications for the relationship between environmental 
risks and subsidiary performance. Our research demonstrates that EMNEs’ localization 
strategies are more complex than staff localization and represent an important mechanism of 
resource exchanges between subsidiaries and local environments in a host country. Different 
levels of input and marketing localization are not only associated with subsidiary 
performance, but also reflect environmental risks. This aspect thus adds a new dimension to 
empirical research in this area. Third, we investigate whether state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
and private firms have different strategic responses to environmental risks and behave 
differently given their different political status, and this study sheds new light on ownership-
related performance implications in internationalization from the resource dependence 
perspective. Finally, this research moves beyond examining the motivation for outward FDI 
and entry mode selections by EMNEs by focusing on the post-entry outcomes of EMNEs, 
given that relatively few studies have examined these outcomes. The findings help to provide 
new insights into the relationship between environmental risks and the subsidiary 
performance of EMNEs and add much needed empirical evidence on factors such as 
environmental risks, input and marketing localization which affect the post-entry success of 
EMNEs in host countries. Subsidiary performance represents the outcome of resolving the 
tension between minimizing environmental risks and exploiting the advantages of 
localization. This study thus provides additional insight into both theory and practice with 
respect to multinational enterprises from emerging economies -- a sector that is of increasing 
importance in today’s competitive landscape (Ahlstrom, 2015; Doh, McGuire & Ozaki, 2015).    
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2. Theoretical background  
Environmental risks in host countries represent key factors affecting subsidiary 
performance (Elango, 2009; Jimenes & Delgado-Garcia, 2012; Mitchell et al., 1992). This 
study examines two such types of risks -- political and industry risks. The former refers to the 
instability and incompletion of the set of laws, regulations, administrative procedures and 
policies formally sanctioned by the government that impact on MNE subsidiaries (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2006, 2008; Delios & Henisz, 2003a). The latter mainly consists of the degree of 
industry competition, industry growth rates, and accessibility of production inputs and human 
resources (Luo, 2003; Luo & Zhao, 2009; Porter, 1990). These risks include input-market 
uncertainties, product-market uncertainties and competitive uncertainties, and represent the 
influence of customers, suppliers and competition in a host country.  
Environmental risks in a host country affect the stability of the market and cost of 
inputs, thus reducing the profitability of MNEs that operate in the host country (Henisz, 2000; 
Jensen, 2006). While prior research has recognized the direct impact of environmental risks 
on subsidiary performance (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006, 2008; Deephouse & Wiseman, 2000; 
Elango, 2009; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Jimenes & Delgado-Garcia, 2012; Lambsdorff, 
2003; Mitchell et al., 1992; Wei, 2000a; 2000b; Veliyath & Ferris, 1997), what remains 
unclear is whether the strategic responses of MNEs mediate the relationship between 
environmental risks and subsidiary performance. Firms are not passive takers of 
environmental risks, and managers often adjust their strategies, such as localization, to align 
their subsidiary operations to the external environment in host countries. This implies that 
there may be a mediating path between environmental risks, localization and subsidiary 
performance.  
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2.1 Resource dependence theory, localization and international performance 
We adopt RDT to examine the extent to which localization strategies mediate the 
environment-subsidiary-performance relationship. RDT proposes that, as open systems, 
organizations are dependent upon external environments to access critical resources, such as 
financial capital, production inputs and legitimacy to operate, survive and thrive (Oliver, 
1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Organizations are both supported and constrained by their 
external environments (Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003; Garud, Jain & Kumaraswamy, 2002). In 
RDT, the external environment in host countries constitutes a source of scarce resources 
sought by MNEs (Moran, 1985), and a dependency situation arises when MNE subsidiaries 
rely on crucial resources controlled by local possessors (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
‘Resources’ in a broad sense include production inputs, marketing resources (e.g. distribution 
networks and consumer base), and information resources (Luo, 2003; Moran, 1985) as well 
as money. Recognizing the active agency of environmental actors (e.g. individuals, firms, 
groups, or governments) on organizations (Dunbar & Ahlstrom, 1995; Garud et al., 2002), 
RDT theorists highlight the interdependence of firms with environmental actors and 
addresses how organizations respond to external environments and counteract the power of 
key resource holders in order to stabilize and better manage resource exchanges (Garud et al., 
2002; Pfeffer, 1987). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 40) defined interdependence as a 
phenomenon that “exists whenever one actor does not entirely control all of the conditions 
necessary for the achievement of an action or for obtaining the outcome desired from the 
action.” 
RDT has been adopted to examine a variety of inter-organizational arrangements, such 
as mergers and acquisitions (M&As), strategic alliances and long-term contracts (Casciaro & 
Piskorski 2005; Deng & Yang, 2015; Haleblian, et al., 2009; Hillman, Withers & Collins, 
2009; Pfeffer 2003; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Xia, 2010) and joint innovation (Christensen, 
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1997; Wang, Ahlstrom, Nair & Hang, 2008). These inter-organizational forms are used to 
mitigate external resource dependencies. Managing resource dependencies is one of the main 
considerations in foreign entry strategies through which organizations aim to absorb the 
uncertainty of resource constraints by powerful organizations that control critical resources in 
a foreign country (Xia, 2010). Several studies have found that forming alliances and joint 
ventures facilitates reliable access to the knowledge and resources of partner organizations 
and provides opportunities for the focal organization to learn and develop new capabilities 
without requiring substantial investment (Ahuja, 2000; Gulati & Sytch, 2007; Peng & 
Beamish, 2014). Similarly, M&A is considered a mechanism for minimizing environmental 
dependence as this strategy enables the acquiring firm to gain desired inputs and broaden the 
organization’s knowledge base (Cui, Meyer & Hu, 2014; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik & Peng, 
2009; Deng & Yang; 2015). Existing research also shows that inter-organizational links are 
dynamic so that firms not only strengthen the existing relationship with crucial resource 
providers, but also pursue new inter-organizational ties subsequently (Beckmen, et al., 2004; 
Kim, Oh & Swaminathan, 2006; Park & Russo, 1996). While some scholars have recognized 
the importance of using inter-organizational ties to manage recourse dependences, others 
have stated that not all resource dependency reducing strategies involve inter-organizational 
links with a resource-controlling organization (Lacity & Hirschheim, 1995; Lacity & 
Willcocks, 1998). The latter argue that developing internal capabilities for the supply of 
crucial resources represents an effective way of mitigating focal-organizational resource 
dependencies, as it reduces focal organizations’ reliance on external parties. This represents 
an alternative and especially salient view about how organizations respond to resource 
dependencies, especially in the context of environmental risks and uncertainty.  
Another stream of research on MNEs’ foreign operations has recognized the 
importance of localization in subsidiaries’ operations and has found that there is a positive 
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relationship between localization and firm performance (Law, Song, Wong & Chen, 2009; 
Lam & Yeung, 2010; Selmer, 2004; Yildiz & Fey, 2012). However, most studies have mainly 
focused on staff localization and the extent to which expatriate managers are replaced by 
local employees (Gaur, Delios & Singh, 2007; Fryxell, Butler & Choi, 2004; Law, Wong & 
Wang, 2004). Thus, this line of research captures an incomplete account of localization which 
is multidimensional and is much broader than just staff localization. Subsidiaries depend not 
only on a host country’s human resources for local production, but also on marketing and 
information resources for local operations, adaptation and expansion. Even with the support 
of its corporate parent, a subsidiary still relies on some country-specific, non-substitutable 
resources for local market expansion (Gaur, Delios & Singh, 2007). Rangan & Drummond 
(2011) emphasize the importance of both input localization and output localization (though 
they use the term ‘output adaptation’) in explaining subsidiary performance and propose that 
appropriate localization strategies are crucial when subsidiaries face external uncertainty in 
host countries.  
While existing studies have enhanced our understanding of the role of resource 
dependencies and localization in MNEs’ foreign operations, few studies have extended the 
resource dependence logic to examine the relationship between environmental risks, 
localization and subsidiary performance. Thus, the tension between minimizing 
environmental risks and exploiting the advantages of localization has not been systematically 
examined. Environmental risk may affect the degree of resource exchange between 
subsidiaries and local firms and induce EMNEs to rebalance environmental dependence using 
localization strategies (Gulati & Sytch, 2007). Employing a RDT logic, localization 
constitutes a distinct means to minimize external risks through altering a subsidiary’s 
dependence on resources held by external actors. In other words, a subsidiary may reduce its 
vulnerability by adjusting the degree of localization and decreasing its interest in valued local 
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resources. In particular, when external environmental risks are high or difficult to absorb, 
internal resource flows between the parent firm and subsidiaries may replace inter-
organizational resource exchange (Feinberg & Gupta, 2009; c, 1991; Lacity & Willcocks, 
1998). Building on RDT, we argue that industry and political risks will induce firms to adjust 
the degree of localization to align their operations to the external environment. Different 
degrees of localization are associated with different levels of access to local resources in a 
host country which have different performance implications. This implies that the level of 
environmental risk is reflected in the extent of input and marketing localization which in turn 
affects subsidiary performance. As such, input and marketing localization mediate the 
environmental risk and performance relationship as shown in Figure 1. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
3. The mediating path for environmental risks 
3.1 Input Localization 
When a local environment becomes risky, MNEs operating in such an environment are 
subject to increasing uncertainty. Environmental risks, either political risks or industry risks, 
curb MNEs’ willingness to increase their dependence on local suppliers (Yildiz & Fey, 2012). 
Where policy credibility is low, firms minimize commitments to a market, or avoid 
investment (Delios & Henisz, 2003b; Henisz & Delios, 2001). As risks increase in host 
countries, heavy reliance on local resources may result in uncertainties and pose significant 
challenges and costs on MNE subsidiaries. Therefore, MNEs may respond to environmental 
risks by altering input localization and reducing their exposure and reliance on local 
resources, and search for alternative ways of obtaining scarce resources (Kostova, Roth & 
Dacin, 2008; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Yildiz & Fey, 2012). Luo (2003) adds that 
subsidiaries can ease their dependence on local suppliers by increasingly drawing resources 
from an MNE’s multi-unit system, thereby reducing unpredictable risks associated with 
10 
 
acquiring resources locally. Thus, a reduced level of input localization may become an 
important strategic response when facing a high level of environmental risks, especially in 
host countries with institutional ambiguities, underdeveloped markets and ineffective 
regulation enforcement (Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson & Peng, 2005).  
The parent firm is considered one of the most important resource providers that a 
subsidiary can rely on when managing and minimizing environmental risks (Chang & Taylor, 
1999; Luo, 2003). Through internal intra-organizational resource flows, subsidiaries can 
control crucial resources when facing environmental uncertainty, thereby reducing resource 
dependence on the external resource holders (Lacity & Hirschheim, 1995; Lacity & 
Willcocks, 1998; Ulrich & Barney, 1984). In this sense, the intra-organizational resource 
flows become a risk reduction mechanism through which EMNEs’ subsidiaries can minimize 
their exposure to environmental risks and alleviate external dependence in a risky host 
country (Feinberg & Gupta, 2009; Kobrin, 1991; Ring, Lenway & Govekar, 1990).  
Although a low level of input localization can reduce MNEs’ exposure to local 
environmental risks, it will in turn affect local subsidiaries’ performance and lead to the loss 
of potential benefits associated with input localization for a number of reasons. First, a low 
level of input localization can increase a subsidiary’ logistic costs and reduce efficiency. The 
subsidiary is also unable to draw on scarce resources that are unavailable internally (Hennart, 
2012). Adopting such an avoiding approach, subsidiaries may reduce repeated local sourcing. 
Thus, MNEs are unable to access complementary local resources, as it is easier to access 
local resources if MNEs frequently contact local suppliers and are embedded in the local 
supply network (Rangan & Drummond, 2011). Second, a subsidiary with a reduced level of 
local human resources may lack local business networks since ties with local businesses are 
not easily obtained without the involvement of local managers and employees (Selmer, 2004; 
Law et al., 2009). The parent company of MNE subsidiaries can use expatriates instead of 
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capable locals in order to maintain independence (Ahlstrom, Bruton & Lui, 2000). However, 
such a strategy results in limited participation in production and management by local people, 
which can negatively affect subsidiary performance, given that local managers have better 
knowledge of the local market environment (Fryxell, Butler & Choi, 2004; Lam & Yeung, 
2010). Finally, with a low level of localization, an MNE will reduce its strategic commitment 
to the host country through decreased local sourcing. Reducing commitment may lead to a 
lack of local support and symbolic resources, such as legitimacy from the host country 
government and local communities (Ahlstrom et al., 2008). This strategy may also result in 
negligible contributions to the host country in terms of local employment, knowledge 
spillovers and related industries. The subsidiary may be treated as an outsider (Eden & Miller, 
2004). Being an outsider may incur the negative effect of liability-of-foreignness, thus 
reducing subsidiary performance (Law et al., 2009).  
It should be noted that there is a counterargument that firms may increase the level of 
input localization to counter balance the environmental risks, such as by choosing joint 
ventures as an entry mode or forming strategic alliances with local partners (Hitt et al., 2000; 
Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). Such arrangements enable firms to gain access to local knowledge 
and contacts, and share environmental risks with local partners. However, the argument does 
not fully reflect the cost of increasing localization in a volatile environment or the ability 
needed to manage a high level of localization (Feinberg & Gupta, 2009; Kobrin, 1991; Meyer 
& Estrin, 2001; Ring, Lenway & Govekar, 1990). Volatility in the political and industrial 
environment in a host country may make it impossible for a subsidiary to anticipate all 
contingencies (Luo, 2003). High environmental risks are likely to jeopardize a subsidiary’s 
operations and may hinder the subsidiary’s ability to enforce cooperative agreements with 
local partners (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Feinberg & Gupta, 2009), leading to higher 
transaction costs when EMNEs rely on local resources. As such, subsidiaries may be 
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constrained in pursuing business opportunities if business transactions with local suppliers 
and distributors are not effectively protected due to environmental risks (Acemoglu & 
Johnson, 2005; Guler & Guillén, 2010). For example, contracts with local suppliers or 
distributors may not be enforced or local suppliers may unreasonably delay delivering raw 
materials needed for operations (Feinberg & Gupta, 2009; Lacity & Hirschheim, 1995; Lacity 
& Willcocks, 1998; Luo, 2003). As a result, EMNEs may prefer to use intra-organizational 
resource flows to replace the inter-organizational relationship (Gulati & Sytch, 2007). 
Through the reduction of localization, EMNEs can reduce exchange uncertainty with local 
partners.  
Moreover, forming a partnership may create a dilemma due to interdependence and a 
loss of autonomy (Das & Teng, 2002). Such a strategy also requires a firm to have the ability 
to manage the inter-organizational relationship effectively. However, EMNEs lack 
experience in managing partner relationships in the early stage of internationalization and 
may be cautious about local partners’ intentions and commitment when facing high 
environmental risks. Hence, they are more likely to depend on their corporate parent for 
resources, or operate as an independent system in order to maintain their autonomy and 
independence (Lu, et al., 2014; Wang, et al., 2012).  
Finally, although transferring resources and knowledge between the parent firm and the 
subsidiary incurs cost (Hansen, Mors & Løvas, 2005; Jensen & Szulanski, 2004), the cost and 
challenges associated with such a transfer is lower than inter-organizational resource 
exchange as the former share an organizational identity and have common corporate 
objectives which help facilitate resource flows and reduce the complexity of resource 
exchange (Venaik, Midgley & Devinney, 2005; Zhao & Anand, 2009). Thus, utilizing a 
multi-unit system to transfer resources and knowledge within the MNE is a particularly 
attractive and feasible strategy for EMNEs that lack international experience to manage inter-
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organizational resource exchange in host countries (Elango & Pattnaik, 2007). In this regard, 
EMNEs’ overseas subsidiaries may choose a lower level of input localization and rely on the 
headquarters to act as a resource provider and risk reduction mechanism.  
In summary, high environmental risks reduce the commitment of MNEs to input 
localization or push MNEs to reduce local exposure or dependence on local resources in 
order to maintain their organizational autonomy and stability in the volatile environments. 
This results in the loss of the benefits associated with input localization. This loss of benefits 
derived from input localization subsequently curbs subsidiary performance in local markets. 
Thus, we hypothesize:  
 
H1a: Input localization mediates the relationship between industry risks in host countries 
and subsidiary performance, in that industry risks negatively affect the level of input 
localization, and the reduction in input localization leads to a decrease in subsidiary 
performance.  
H1b: Input localization mediates the relationship between political risks in host countries 
and subsidiary performance, in that political risks negatively affect input localization, thus 
reducing subsidiary performance.   
 
3.2 Marketing Localization 
A similar rationale can be applied to the mediating role of marketing localization. Marketing 
localization is akin to local responsiveness and refers to the extent to which MNEs operate 
foreign subsidiaries according to local norms, adapt products to suit local tastes, localize a 
corporate image and become socially embedded in local networks (Rangan & Drummond, 
2011). This strategy requires adaptations to local consumer needs, thus escalating interactions 
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with the host market. With high environmental risks, MNEs are less willing to commit to a 
high degree of marketing localization, especially in the early stages of investment (Figueira-
de-Lemos, Johanson & Vahlne, 2011). This is because a large number of resources, such as 
experienced personnel, is needed for successful marketing localization in highly risky 
environments where conditions change rapidly (Lam & Yeung, 2010; Waldman, Ramirez, 
House & Puranam, 2001), thereby increasing MNEs’ operational costs in host countries. 
Furthermore, high environmental risks not only reduce MNEs’ willingness to commit to 
marketing localization, but also create difficulties in executing the marketing localization 
strategy. In particular, firms from emerging economies may lack the knowledge and 
experience needed for implementing marketing localization in host countries (Guillén & 
Garcia-Canal, 2009; Meyer, Mudambi & Narula, 2011), thereby putting additional hurdles in 
achieving successful local adaptation (Figueira-de-Lemos et al., 2011). In particular, a risky 
industry environment impairs a firm’s ability to locally source inputs or value chain activities, 
thus increasing operational costs and managerial overheads in the process of organizational 
control (Oliver, 1991). This may decrease firms’ marketing localization.  
The above discussion implies that a high risk environment may push an MNE 
subsidiary to reduce the degree of marketing localization, which then leads the subsidiary to 
decrease its dependence on host country resources and reduce its exposure to host country 
environments. Such a strategy helps to reduce its vulnerability to the risky environment of a 
host county. However, a decrease in marketing localization because of high environmental 
risks can adversely influence the performance of a subsidiary since marketing localization 
can be utilized as a means to enhance subsidiary performance. Marketing localization enables 
an MNE to be more accepted locally by behaving more like a local firm through marketing 
and product adaptation (Eden & Miller, 2004). In particular, adaptation to the cultural values, 
needs and expectations of local customers increases local acceptance of MNEs’ products or 
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services and, thereby, increases the possibility of successful operations in host countries 
(Yildiz & Fey, 2012). Marketing localization is also a key strategy for firms to gather local 
market knowledge and build closer linkages with local suppliers and customers (Andersen, 
2013; Gertler, 2003). It helps to avoid the misunderstanding of local demand conditions and 
has positive operational implications. Therefore, when high environment risks reduce the 
level of marketing localization, firms lose the potential benefits discussed above, which may 
hinder their subsidiary performance. Our discussion leads to the following hypotheses: 
H2a: Marketing localization mediates the relationship between industry risks in host 
countries and subsidiary performance, in that industry risks negatively affect the level of 
marketing localization, and the reduction in marketing localization leads to a decrease in 
subsidiary performance.  
H2b: Marketing localization mediates the relationship between political risks in host 
countries and subsidiary performance, in that political risks negatively affect marketing 
localization, thus reducing subsidiary performance.  
 
4. The moderating effect of ownership 
Firms are shaped by the home context from which they originate (Holburn & Zelner 
2010; Meyer et al., 2011). As such, a firm’s capability and resource endowments developed 
in their home country affect their strategic responses to environmental risks when operating 
in a host country. It is recognized that organizational practices and capability vary with 
ownership (Li & Xia, 2008) and so different ownership results in different levels of political 
support and legitimacy (Peng & Luo, 2000). SOEs differ from private firms in terms of the 
organizational structures, management systems and resource endowments (Wright et al., 
2005). The different characteristics of SOEs and private firms may lead to different strategic 
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responses to environmental risks and hence result in different subsidiary performance (Lin, 
2010; Peng, 2003; Wright et al., 2005).  
SOEs are both economic and political actors and operate in a highly regulated 
environment controlled by their home country government. Their special position has 
implications for their response to environment risks when operating in foreign countries. First, 
from the resource dependency perspective, SOEs are able to draw on resources from their 
home government or receive preferential treatment due to their political status and a close 
relationship with the home country government, especially when dealing with political risks 
in foreign operations (Luo, Xue & Han, 2010). Home government support can result in 
resource advantages and alters the extent to which environmental risks influence foreign 
operations. In this sense, SOEs may be more risk tolerant than their counterparts i.e. private 
firms (Cui & Jiang, 2012). The close relationship between SOEs and the home country 
government also enables SOEs to obtain superior access to timely and accurate information 
on policy interpretations and changes (Bruton, Peng, Ahlstrom, Stan & Xu, 2015). These can 
help SOEs anticipate changes in the policy environment and thus better prepare to respond to 
political risks (Schuler, Rehbein & Cramer, 2002). Second, burdensome government 
intervention at home provides SOEs with a training ground for dealing with environmental 
and political changes in a host country (Morck, Yeung & Zhao, 2008). Chinese SOEs, for 
example, have considerable experience of dealing with complex and under-developed 
institutions through frequently interacting with the home country government (Bruton et al., 
2015; Bruton, Ahlstrom & Yeh, 2004). They can draw upon their accumulated experiences in 
responding to political risks when operating in a host country.  
In contrast, private firms are less supported by the home country government than their 
SOE counterparts. Private firms often directly face fierce competition in the domestic market, 
forcing them to be more flexible and efficient in their operations (Lin, 2010). In particular, 
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competing in unfavorable market conditions, private firms may have developed market-based 
capabilities by mainly following market principles and seeking commercial interests. They 
are less likely to be vulnerable to industry risks than SOEs (Lu, Liu & Wang, 2011).  
In summary, it is anticipated that SOEs are able to counterbalance the political risks in 
host countries due to their close attachment to their home country government. Indeed, 
political resources enable SOEs to mitigate political risks more effectively than private firms. 
Unlike SOEs, private firms have a low level of political resources and are less able to rely on 
the home country government to reduce the level of political risks in host countries. Thus, 
political risks may have a more negative impact on the level of localization of private firms 
than that of SOEs. However, SOEs that have evolved in an environment that is subject to 
government intervention may lack market-based capability compared with private firms (Li 
& Xia, 2008). Therefore, industry risks may have a more negative impact on the level of 
localization of SOEs than private firms. Hence, we hypothesize: 
H3a: State ownership moderates the extent to which input localization mediates the 
relationship between industry and political risks and subsidiary performance in host 
countries. 
H3b: State ownership moderates the extent to which marketing localization mediates the 
relationship between industry and political risks and subsidiary performance in host 
countries. 
 
5. Methods 
5.1 Sample and Data Collection 
The data used in this study was collected through collaboration with the Asia Pacific 
Foundation of Canada (APFC) and the China Council for the Promotion of International 
Trade (CCPIT)1. Such collaboration allowed us to access the networks of the APFC and 
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CCPIT. Previous surveys on China’s outward FDI conducted by the CCPIT and APFC have 
been widely cited (e.g., Luo, Xue & Han, 2010; Tung, 2007; UNCTD, 2006).  
We first developed the survey questionnaire in English and then, with the assistance of 
independent translators, the questionnaire was translated into Chinese, and finally translated 
back to English to ensure conceptual equivalence (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau & Wright, 2000). 
We conducted four in-depth interviews with CCPIT officials to validate our measurements 
and then modified a few questionnaire items based on the feedback from our interviews. We 
also trialed the questionnaire with ten senior managers who were in charge of outward FDI in 
the CCPIT’s membership enterprises and further revised the questionnaire according to their 
feedback. 
We compared the CCPIT’s membership enterprises list with that of Chinese firms that 
registered their outward FDI activities with China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) to 
identify Chinese firms that have actively engaged in outward FDI. The latter list was 
considered the most comprehensive list of Chinese firms that have outward FDI activities 
(Cui & Jiang, 2012). A total of 2,000 firms were randomly chosen due to cost and 
administrative constraints. These firms were CCPIT’s membership enterprises and also on the 
MOFCOM’s registration list for their outward FDI activities.  
The headquarters of the CCPIT in Beijing received a total of 365 completed 
questionnaires, representing a response rate of 18.25%. We found 32 completed 
questionnaires contained basic information which was inconsistent with that on the CCPIT’s 
membership enterprises database. Thus, these 32 firms were deleted from the data, resulting 
in 333 verified questionnaires, representing a response rate of 16.7%. We also randomly 
checked 20 respondents via telephone to confirm that the questionnaire was completed by 
senior managers who were familiar with their firms’ internationalization activities. We also 
compared location and industries between the responding firms and non-responding ones and 
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found these two groups of firms have similar distribution patterns in industries and location2. 
Foreign wholly-owned subsidiaries in China were dropped from the sample, given our focus 
on the overseas subsidiary performance of Chinese firms (Yiu, Lau & Bruton, 2007). Our 
final sample consisted of 206 Chinese firms, among which 55 are SOEs and 151 are private 
firms in 14 different industries and investing in 58 foreign countries. 
5.2. Variables and Measurements 
5.2.1. Dependent variable  
Similar to previous studies (He, Tian & Chen, 2007; Lu et al., 2010; Woodcock, 
Beamish & Makino, 1994), this study adopted the same perceptual measure for the subsidiary 
performance of Chinese MNEs. This self-evaluation approach was appropriate because (1) 
firms were either unwilling or unable to provide sensitive accounting data (e.g. performance); 
(2) variations in accounting standards across countries reduced the comparability and/or (3) 
there were fluctuations in exchange rates between home and host countries (He et al., 2007; 
Woodcock et al., 1994). Although difficulties such as self-enhancement and objectivity might 
be encountered, self-evaluated surveys have been proved to possess strong internal 
consistency and reliability (Cooper & Artz, 1995; Ketokivi & Schroeder, 2004) and have 
been widely used in previous studies (Andersson, Forsgren & Holm, 2002; Birkinshaw, Hood 
& Young; 2005; He et al., 2007; Lu et al., 2010).  
We asked respondents to evaluate the performance of the most recently established 
overseas subsidiaries. Focusing on these recently established subsidiaries has a few 
advantages. First, respondents can more easily identify the focal overseas subsidiary from 
other overseas subsidiaries, and thus increase the reliability of the self-evaluated measures. 
Second, all other key independent variables, i.e. environment risks, input localization, and 
marketing localization, are based on questions on the focal overseas subsidiary. Thus, the 
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dependent variable and the key independent variables are all about the same overseas 
subsidiary.  
Three seven-point Likert-scale items (1=very dissatisfied; 7=very satisfied) were used 
to capture managers’ perception of the performance of their most recently established 
overseas subsidiaries, including the extent of managers’ satisfaction in terms of the growth 
rate of sales, growth rate of market share and growth rate of profit in their overseas 
subsidiaries. Based on these components, we used factor analysis to construct a proxy for the 
subsidiary performance of the sample firms, given that newer subsidiaries, in particular, may 
be loss-making or have little revenue since they are in the early stages of developing a market 
presence (Dai & Liu, 2009). Therefore, a manager’s satisfaction with the growth rate is a 
fundamental measure of subsidiary performance (Cooper & Artz, 1995). 
5.2.2. Independent variables 
Based on previous research (Luo & Zhao, 2009) and the evaluation and practical 
insights of the managers in our pilot study, we developed five seven-point Likert scale items 
to capture the extent to which managers perceive host country industry risks in terms of: (1) 
level of industrial competition, (2) availability of inputs, raw materials and components, (3) 
prices of inputs, raw materials and components, (4) availability of human resources, and (5) 
availability of financial capital.  
In measuring political risks, we employed an objective measurement, the World 
Governance Index (WGI) in 2010, which has been widely adopted in previous studies to 
capture host country political risks (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Slangen & van Tulder, 
2009). The WGI reports governance indicators for 215 economies from 1996 to 2012 and 
covers six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political instability and 
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi, 2008). As each dimension has been constructed by 
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compiling a number of primary and secondary data sources, the index offers reliable and 
comprehensive proxies for empirical studies (Oh & Oetzel, 2011). 
5.2.3.Mediating variables 
While international business studies have addressed the concept of localization, 
especially from the human resource perspective (e.g. Ahlstrom, Bruton & Chan, 2001; Law et 
al., 2004; 2009; Lam & Yeung, 2010), few studies have developed measurements for 
localization. Based on the existing literature and our pilot study mentioned above, we 
developed three seven-point Likert scale items to measure firms’ input localization. We 
asked the respondents to indicate the extent to which their overseas subsidiaries have 
acquired: (1) local raw materials and components; (2) local human resources; and (3) local 
financial capital.  
Marketing localization has been identified as an important element of a firm’s global 
strategy. Based on prior studies (Law et al., 2009), we developed three seven-point Likert 
scale items to ask the respondents to indicate the extent to which their overseas subsidiaries 
have: (1) adapted to local business culture; (2) adapted to local customers’ needs; (3) 
developed local networks and partnerships. 
5.2.4. Control variables 
We included four control variables which may affect international performance, namely 
firm age (Fang, Wade, Delios & Beamish, 2007; Zhou, Wu & Luo, 2007), firm size (Lu et al., 
2010; Luo & Peng, 1999), local experience (Fang et al., 2007) and entry mode. The four 
variables are measured by the number of years since founding, the number of employees, the 
number of years of overseas subsidiaries operating in host countries, and whether a firm has 
chosen green field FDI as the entry mode. 
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6. Results 
We employed a structural equation modeling (SEM) approach which avoids problems 
of overestimation and underestimation of mediation effects by controlling for measurement 
errors (Hoyle & Smith, 1994). This method is most suitable to our study as it examines the 
mediation effects of localization on the relationship between environmental risks and 
international performance. 
6.1. Validity and reliability of the constructs 
To minimize the effect of common method variance, we took the following steps. First, 
multiple item constructs were used in our survey, since response biases are more likely to 
occur at the item level than at the construct level. In addition, our main hypotheses involve 
mediating effects. It is observed that complex relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables are not part of the respondents’ theory-in-use (Chang, van 
Witteloostuijn & Eden, 2010). This helps reduce the risks of common method variance. 
Furthermore, we used an objective measurement for one of the independent variables 
(political risk) which helps to avoid common method variance since the dependent variable is 
constructed using information from different sources than the independent variable (Chang, et 
al., 2010). Finally, we conducted Harman’s single-factor test and found that the single factor 
model demonstrated a poor fit to the data (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Thus, common 
methods bias is not a major threat to the subsequent hypothesis testing. Table 1 shows the 
descriptive statistics. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
We tested the construct composite reliability (CR), convergent and discriminant 
validity of the constructs in accordance with accepted practice. The CR values for all 
constructs were good, ranging from 0.6 to 0.98. The five-factor confirmatory factor analysis 
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(CFA) model provided a good overall fit with the data, with all indices meeting the respective 
criteria: χ2(142)=313.165, p<0.001; NNFI=0.94; CFI=0.95; RMSEA=0.078; SRMR=0.084. 
Table 2 presents the CFA results, which indicate good convergent validity. The average 
variance extracted (AVE) and the square of the correlations between constructs are listed in 
Table 3. Discriminant validity is established if the AVE is larger than the squared multiple 
correlation coefficients between constructs. Our results demonstrate the fulfilling of this 
criterion, thus providing strong support to discriminant validity. Hence, the measurement 
scales used in this study were found to be reliable and valid. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 AND TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
6.2. Hypothesis tests 
The mediation effect is tested by comparing the goodness-of-fit of the direct effect 
model with that of a full predictor-mediator-outcome mediation model which has no direct 
path from the predictor to the outcome and a partial mediation model which has freely 
estimated a direct path from the predictor to outcome. Table 4 summarizes the results of the 
mediation tests. M1 is a direct effect model with both risk constructs and both localization 
constructs directly linked to subsidiary performance. The fit indices of M1 signal a poor 
overall fit: χ2=260.21, df=28; NNFI=0.13; CFI=0.32; RMSEA=0.204; SRMR=0.161. M2 
presents the results of the partially mediated model, where industry risks and political risks 
are linked to input localization and marketing localization. M2 represents a significant 
improvement of M1. However, the overall goodness-of-fit indices (χ2=66.46, df=24; 
NNFI=0.81; CFI=0.88; RMSEA=0.094; SRMR=0.079) indicate that further modifications 
are needed. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
M3 represents a full, partially mediated model, where an additional mediating path 
from marketing localization to input localization was added to M2. This has further improved 
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a good overall fit: χ2=49.34, df=23; NNFI=0.88 CFI=0.92; RMSEA=0.076; SRMR=0.073. 
M4, a full mediation model, was estimated, where each direct path between both risk 
constructs and performance in M3 was constrained to zero. The findings reveal that the fit 
indices of M4 were good and similar to those of M3: χ2=54.92, df=25; NNFI=0.87; CFI=0.91; 
RMSEA=0.077; SRMR=0.075. We further tested M5 and M6, each with one direct effect 
from environmental risks to subsidiary performance. M5 is a partial mediation model with the 
direct effect from political risk to performance, and the findings reveal better fit indices: 
χ2=49.91, df=24; NNFI=0.89; CFI=0.92; RMSEA=0.073; SRMR=0.073. M6 is a partial 
mediation model with the direct effect from industry risk to performance with slightly worse 
fit indices: χ2=54.43, df=24; NNFI=0.87; CFI=0.91; RMSEA=0.080; SRMR=0.075. The 
results are consistent with previous research which has long argued for the impact of political 
risks on subsidiary performance (e.g. Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006, 2008; Deephouse & Wiseman, 
2000; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Lambsdorff, 2003; Wei, 2000a; 2000b; Veliyath & Ferris, 
1997). Since M4-6 do not improve the overall fit of M3, M3 is chosen as the baseline model 
for further assessment of the hypotheses. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 2 illustrates the standardized parameter estimates for M3 (the full partial 
mediation model). Hypothesis 1a stated that input localization mediates the relationship 
between industry risks and subsidiary performance. As shown in Figure 2, the hypothesized 
path from industry risks to input localization is negatively significant (β=-1.12, p<0.001), and 
the path from input localization to performance is also significant (β=0.16, p<0.01). 
Hypothesis 2a stated that marketing localization mediates the relationship between industry 
risks and performance. Similar to Hypothesis 1a, the paths from industry risks to marketing 
localization (β=-0.29, p<0.01) and from marketing localization to performance (β=0.44, 
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p<0.001) are both statistically significant. Thus, Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 2a are 
strongly supported. 
Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 2b held that input localization and marketing 
localization mediate the relationship between political risk and subsidiary performance 
respectively. As shown in Figure 2, although there is a significant relationship between input 
and marketing localization and subsidiary performance, the relationships between political 
risks and input localization (β=0.04, i.s.) and marketing localization (β=0.14, i.s.) are not 
statistically significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 2b was not supported. 
However, the findings show a direct statistically significant path from political risk to 
subsidiary performance (β=0.14, p<0.05). 
Furthermore, the findings also demonstrate a statistically significant path from 
marketing localization to input localization (β=0.22, p<0.001). This indicates that the 
mediating effect of marketing localization on the subsidiary performance of Chinese firms is 
partially channeled through input localization. It may indicate that marketing localization 
contributes positively to the extent of input localization which in turn leads to an 
improvement in international performance. 
6.3. The moderating effect of ownership  
In order to account for the moderating impact of ownership, a multi-group analysis was 
performed to test H3a and H3b. Table 5 reports the results of multiple-group analysis based 
on ownership: SOEs and private firms. The overall fit indices (χ2=67.21, df=46; NNFI=0.90; 
CFI=0.94; RMSEA=0.048) suggest that the baseline model (the full partial mediation model 
M3) fits the data well across both groups of firms. We compared the baseline model with a 
series of nested models by constraining the relevant coefficients of the paths as equal across 
both groups. For each nested model (M3-1 to M3-9 in Table 5), when ∆χ2 is statistically 
significant, it indicates that the assumption that the coefficient of the constrained path is the 
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same for SOEs and private firms is rejected, which means ownership has a moderating effect 
on this path.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
The results partially support H3a which proposes that state ownership moderates the 
extent to which input localization mediates the relationship between industry and political 
risks and performance. The results show that state ownership significantly affects the paths 
from industry risks to input localization. By further comparing the standardized coefficients 
in Table 5, we find that industry risks have a more negative impact on the input localization 
of SOEs (β=-1.36, p<0.001) than that of private firms (β=-1.03, p<0.001).  
 
7. Discussion 
This paper has examined whether input localization and marketing localization mediate the 
impact of political risks and industry risks on subsidiary performance, and the moderating 
effect of state ownership on this mediation mechanism based on a sample of Chinese MNEs. 
The results indicate that localization strategies mediate industry risks, but have no mediating 
effect on the link between political risks and subsidiary performance. These findings suggest 
that the impact of industry risks on subsidiary performance is channeled through input and 
marketing localization. However, political risks do not affect the level of localization, but 
have a positive effect on Chinese MNEs’ overseas performance directly. The findings imply 
that host country industry risks have a significant negative impact on Chinese MNEs’ 
overseas subsidiary performance channeled through reducing the level of localization, and 
Chinese MNEs tend to use internal resource flows to reduce environmental dependence when 
they operate in risky industries in host countries. The results indicate that those MNEs 
originating in an under-developed institutional environment with incomplete marketization 
are more able to deal with political risks than industry risks.  
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The findings further show that Chinese MNEs are more likely to choose a higher level 
of marketing localization than input localization, given the level of industry risks. This may 
be because of the stage of Chinese MNEs’ internationalization. With an average subsidiary 
age of three years, the majority of the sample firms are still in the early stages of outward FDI, 
and the tangible commitment of these firms to local markets, reflected in input localization, is 
relatively low when environmental risks are high. This is consistent with the proposition put 
forward by Figueira-de-Lemos et al. (2011) that under high environmental risks, a firm’s 
commitment is low because of uncertainty, especially its commitment in a tangible form 
(input localization), and its limited commitment is reflected by mainly making intangible 
commitments, which is captured by marketing localization in this study.  
Furthermore, the paper has found that the mediating effect of marketing localization on 
subsidiary performance is partially channeled through input localization. This indicates that 
marketing localization contributes positively to the extent of input localization which in turn 
leads to an improvement in subsidiary performance. When firms accumulate more knowledge 
about the local market and understand potential opportunities through marketing localization 
(Figueira-de-Lemos et al., 2011, Johanson & Vahlne, 2006), they increase their commitment 
to the foreign market in a more tangible way through input localization in order to capitalize 
on the potential opportunities.  
Contrary to the majority of previous studies (e.g. Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006, 2008; 
Deephouse & Wiseman, 2000; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Lambsdorff, 2003; Wei, 2000a; 
2000b; Veliyath & Ferris, 1997), this study reveals that Chinese MNEs tend to perform better 
in countries with higher political risks. The positive relationship between political risk and 
performance indicates that EMNEs may be able to proactively exploit the opportunity 
associated with political risk (Jimenez & Delgado-Garcia, 2012; Kozhikode & Li, 2012), 
given that they have accumulated political capabilities when operating in their home country 
28 
 
with the under-developed institutional environment. China has gone through dramatic 
political and economic change in the past few decades, which has provided a training ground 
for Chinese firms to accumulate experience and build capabilities in dealing with 
unpredictable environments (Ahlstrom, Levitas, Hitt, Dacin & Zhu, 2014). Such experiences 
and capabilities developed at home can be exploited by these firms when operating in a host 
country with high political risks (Morck et al., 2008).  
The results of testing ownership effect (presented in Table 5) further reveal the 
difference between SOEs and private firms in managing environmental risks. Chinese SOEs 
are more vulnerable to industry risks through localization strategies. At the same level of 
industry risks, SOEs have a lower level of commitment to locally sourcing their inputs than 
that of private firms. The results imply that SOEs are less able to deal with industry risks in 
host countries due to a lack of flexibility and the ability needed to acquire local resources 
under industry risks. 
7.1. Contributions 
This study makes three contributions to the existing literature. First, unlike previous 
research which either emphasized the impact of environmental risks or localization on 
performance in isolation, this study extends the resource dependence logic to examine 
interconnections between environmental risks, localization and subsidiary performance. This 
helps provide new insights into how EMNEs balance environmental dependence in 
responding to environmental risks in host countries. The findings enhance our understanding 
of the mechanisms through which the effect of environmental risks on subsidiary 
performance is realized and thus fill an important research gap on firms form emerging 
economies (cf. Young, Tsai, Wang, Liu & Ahlstrom, 2014). Specifically, we bridge two 
streams of literature on environmental risks and localization. In the established literature, 
localization is linked to the choice of entry modes, the deployment of local personnel in the 
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top management team of the subsidiary, and imitation of local practices (Fryxell et al., 2004; 
Law et al., 2009; Lam & Yeung, 2010). Few studies have examined the mediating effect of 
localization strategies on the relationship between environmental risk and subsidiary 
performance. On the other hand, in the literature on environmental risks and MNEs, 
researchers often focus on the direct link between environmental risks and performance by 
treating the mechanism through which environmental risks affect subsidiary performance as a 
black box. Departing from prior research, we go beyond the direct links postulated in existing 
studies by explicitly examining the mediating path among these factors. In so doing, this 
study advances our understanding of how EMNEs alter their localization strategies and use 
intra-organizational resource flows to reduce environmental dependence when facing risks in 
host countries.  
Second, we move beyond the traditional focus on staff localization and further delineate 
localization into input and marketing localization. Our study explicitly demonstrates that 
input and marketing localization are important factors which mediate the relationship 
between industry risks and subsidiary performance. Hence, our research helps capture the 
complexity of localization and shed new light on the importance of localization strategies in 
subsidiary performance from the resource dependence perspective.  
Third, considering the moderating effect of ownership on the relationship between 
environmental risks and localization, we found that the impact of environmental risks is 
contingent on firm ownership. Industry risks have a stronger negative impact on the extent of 
localization of SOEs than that of private firms. Private firms may have established market-
based capabilities which help them to cope with commercial risks in international operations, 
whereas SOEs that rely on government support instead of market-based capabilities at home 
are less able to deal with industry risks in host countries. Our analysis suggests that EMNEs 
carry the baggage embedded in their home country even when they operate abroad. The 
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ownership status which is associated with the availability of resources and support from the 
home country government affects firms’ responses to environment risks when operating in 
foreign countries. This evidence broadens our understanding of how the relationship between 
environmental risks and performance is shaped by EMNEs’ home context through ownership.  
7.2. Managerial relevance 
Our findings have a number of managerial implications and provide managers with a 
better understanding of mechanisms through which environmental risks affect subsidiary 
performance. First, our findings show that both input and marketing localization are 
important mediators linking industry risks and subsidiary performance. Because of the 
negative relationship between industry risks and localization, and the positive relationship 
between localization and performance, firms are able to achieve a higher level of 
performance in less risky industries in host countries. In order to capitalize high-risk/high-
return expectations, managers should commit more to both input and marketing localization 
in responding to higher industry risks. By breaking the negative association between industry 
risks and localization, firms can benefit more from localization, thereby achieving better 
subsidiary performance.  
Second, our findings show that SOEs are more vulnerable to industry risks in host 
countries, while political risks do not deter their localization strategies. This suggests that 
SOEs managers need to have a better understanding of industry risks in order to respond to 
such risks appropriately in host countries, and can achieve successful international operations 
by minimizing industry risks through different configurations of input and marketing 
localization. Managers of SOEs need to develop market-based capabilities and accumulate 
international experience in order to implement localization strategies effectively when 
dealing with industry risks. Managers should also build an understanding of the mechanisms 
through which SOEs can seek to balance autonomy and environmental dependencies (Stan, 
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Peng & Bruton, 2014). They may need to step out their comfort zone and learn how to 
manage partner dependence in dealing with industry risks in host countries.  
Third, Chinese MNEs are able to achieve a higher level of performance in host 
countries with higher political risks, which indicates that they have developed political 
capabilities at home to deal with uncertainties in the political sphere. Future Chinese MNEs 
can utilize the domestic market as a training ground to build up their political capabilities 
before investing in countries with high political risks. As for those investing in more political 
stable countries, Chinese MNEs may need to develop more market-oriented capabilities in 
order to achieve a higher level of performance as they have fewer opportunities to exploit 
their political capabilities in such host countries. 
7.3. Limitations and future research 
Our study has some limitations which represent avenues for future studies. First, we 
only use a perceptual measure for subsidiary performance. Future studies could use objective 
measures to compare how localization and environmental risks affect different dimensions of 
subsidiary performance. Second, our study is based on a sample of Chinese MNEs; further 
research is needed to examine whether our findings can be generalized in other emerging 
economy contexts. Third, our study only focuses on the environmental risks in host countries. 
Future study could further explore institutions in both home and host countries, as well as 
political relations between the two, which has been previously linked to the motivation of 
foreign investment of EMNEs, to provide a holistic picture of the impact of external 
environment. The subsidiary performance of EMNEs is a significant topic, but has received 
limited attention. The present study takes a first step towards providing empirical evidence on 
the extent to which localization strategies by EMNEs affect the link between environmental 
risks and subsidiary performance when operating in foreign countries. We hope that our 
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research will lead to further examination of this issue, which will advance our understanding 
of EMNEs. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Adopting resource dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), this paper examines the 
mediating effect of localization on the relationship between environmental risks and 
subsidiary performance using a sample of Chinese MNEs. We find that industry risks in host 
countries reduce the level of input and marketing localization of Chinese MNEs. The 
reduction in localization negatively affects subsidiary performance. The results show that 
localization strategies mediate industry risks, but do not mediate the impact of political risk 
on subsidiary performance. Moreover, there is a direct link between political risks and 
subsidiary performance. By examining the mediating effect of localization, the study 
highlights the fact that the impact of industry risks on subsidiary performance depends on the 
degree of localization, which acts as a mechanism through which industry risks affect 
EMNEs’ subsidiary performance in host countries. Our findings further indicate that SOEs 
are more vulnerable to industry risks than private firms. Taken together, our study 
demonstrates that industry risks and political risks affect subsidiary performance in different 
ways. The impact of industry risks depends on how subsidiaries respond to such risks through 
adjusting the level of localization, which in turn affects subsidiary performance. However, 
political risks have a direct impact on subsidiary performance regardless of the level of 
localization. Evidence was also found that private firms are more capable of dealing with 
industry risks than SOEs, given different capabilities associated with ownership status. These 
findings enrich understanding of the links between the various environmental risks and the 
performance of the subsidiaries of MNEs from emerging economies – an increasingly 
important group of organizations today.   
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Notes 
1 Established in May 1952, the CCPIT comprises representative individuals, enterprises and 
organizations in the economic and trade sectors of the country. By the end of 2011, it had 
nearly 70,000 member enterprises around China. 
2 As basic information in CCPIT’s membership enterprises dataset has not been updated, we 
cannot compare non-responding bias using information such as on the number of employees 
and sales. 
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Table 1: Means, standard deviations and correlations 
 Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Subsidiary performance 3.96 0.88 1          
2. Input localization 1.97 1.14 0.44** 1         
3. Marketing localization 4.26 0.98 0.59** 0.36** 1        
4. Political risks 2.06 0.81 0.19* 0.10 0.13 1       
5. Industry risks 1.86 0.74 -0.34** -0.77** -0.23** -0.06 1      
6. Firm age 17.34 15.04 0.05 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.07 1     
7. Firm size 6.59 2.26 0.09 0.01 0.01 -0.13 0.05 0.35** 1    
8. Local experience 3.09 2.75 0.06 -0.04 0.05 -0.10 0.04 0.04 -0.07 1   
9. Entry mode 0.72 0.45 -0.05 -0.13 -0.03 -0.02 0.09 0.04 0.15* 0.08 1  
10. Ownership 0.27 0.44 -0.06 0.03 -0.11 0.03 0.00 0.31** 0.27** -0.05 0.11 1 
Note: sample size=206; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; two-tailed test.  
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Table 2: Measurement scales and properties 
constructs Measurement items CR Factor loading R2 value
Subsidiary performance 0.89
 Subsidiary profit growth  0.82 0.68
 Subsidiary sales growth  0.86 0.73
 Subsidiary market share growth  0.88 0.78
Input localization 0.60
 Local raw materials and components  0.78 0.60
 Local human resource  0.52 0.27
 Local financial capital a    
Marketing localization 0.82
 Developed local networks and partnerships  0.79 0.62
 Adapted to local customers’ needs  0.87 0.76
 Adapted to the local business culture  0.67 0.45
Political risks 0.98
 Voice and accountability  0.79 0.62
 Political stability  0.88 0.77
 Government effectiveness  0.99 0.98
 Regulatory quality  0.98 0.96
 Rule of law  0.99 0.98
 Control of corruption  0.98 0.96
Industry risks 0.72
 Level of industrial competition  0.60 0.36
 Availability of inputs, raw materials and components  0.76 0.58
 Prices of inputs, raw materials and components  0.67 0.45
 Availability of human resource a    
 Availability of financial capital a    
a indicates item that was dropped during the scale purification process.
50 
 
Table 3: Discriminant validity 
Constructs International 
performance
Input localization Marketing 
localization
Political risks Industry risks
Subsidiary performance 0.73     
Input localization 0.13 0.44    
Marketing localization 0.28 0.08 0.61   
Political risks 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.89  
Industry risks 0.08 0.39 0.04 0.01 0.46
Note: Variances extracted are on the diagonal; square correlations are off-diagonal. 
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Table 4: Hypothesis test of alternative model 
Model & structure χ2 df ∆χ2 NNFI CFI RMSEA SRMR 
M1: direct effect model 260.21 28 - 0.13 0.32 0.204 0.161 
M2: M1 + mediation links 
partially mediated model 
66.46 24 ∆χ2(M1, M2)=193.75** 0.81 0.88 0.094 0.079 
M3: M2+ ML->IL 
partially mediated model 
49.34 23 ∆χ2(M2, M3)=17.12** 0.88 0.92 0.076 0.073 
M4: M3 direct path=0 
full mediated model 
54.92 25 ∆χ2(M3, M4)=5.58 0.87 0.91 0.077 0.075 
M5: M4+PR->IP 
partially mediated model 
49.91 24 ∆χ2(M5, M3)=0.57 0.89 0.92 0.073 0.073 
M6: M4+IR->IP 
partially mediated model 
54.43 24 ∆χ2(M6, M3)=5.09* 0.87 0.91 0.080 0.075 
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
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Table 5: Multiple-group analysis by ownership 
Model & structure χ2 df ∆χ2 NNFI CFI RMSEA Standardized coefficient a 
M3: baseline model 49 24 - 0.89 0.93 0.073 - 
M3: no parameter constraints two-
groups model 67.21 46 - 0.90 0.94 0.048 - 
M3_1: IR->IL path equal 71.86 47 4.65* 0.89 0.93 0.052 SOEs: β=-1.36**Private firms: β=-1.03** 
M3_2: IR->ML path equal 68.11 47 0.90 0.91 0.94 0.048 - 
M3_3: PR->IL path equal 67.21 47 0.00 0.91 0.94 0.046 - 
M3_4: PR->ML path equal 67.49 47 0.28 0.91 0.94 0.047 - 
M3_5: PR->IP path equal 67.26 47 0.05 0.91 0.94 0.047 - 
M3_6: IR->IP path equal 68.03 47 0.82 0.91 0.94 0.048  
M3_7: ML->IL path equal 67.31 47 0.10 0.91 0.94 0.047 - 
M3_8: IL->IP path equal 68.19 47 0.98 0.90 0.94 0.048 - 
M3_9: ML->IP path equal 68.64 47 1.43 0.90 0.94 0.048 - 
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
a When ∆χ2 is statistically significant, it indicates that the hypothesis that a certain path is equal for SOEs and private firms is rejected. Therefore, the 
different standardized coefficients of this path for SOEs and private firms are reported here.
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Figure 1: Mediating path for environment risks 
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Figure 2: Results of SEM on the partially mediated model M3 
 
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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